Im Jahr 1926 veroffentlichte Viktor von Weizsacker im ersten Jahrgang der von ihm gemeinsam mit Martin Buber und Joseph Wittig begrundeten Zeitschrift "Die Kreatur" einen Essay unter dem Titel "Die Schmerzen." Als sprachliche Form des Umgangs mit dem Schmerz wird dieser Text gleichwohl zum Pladoyer fur das Problematische am Verhaltnis von Schmerz und Sprache. Die Not der Unsagbarkeit lasst den Schmerz zum Indikator fur den Verlust einer Ordnung werden, die Sprache wie Leben allererst ermoglicht. "So wird die Wahrnehmung des Schmerzes (...) verwandelt in eine Kritik der Wirklichkeit, in ein Instrument der Scheidung von echt und unecht in der Erscheinung des Lebendigen."Weder war bislang der literarische und philosophische Wert dieses Essays im Blick, noch ist gesehen worden, dass mit dem hier dargestellten besonderen Zusammenhang von Schmerz und Sprache eine Grundlegung der therapeutischen Kompetenz Medizinischer Anthropologie erfolgt.So wirft der vorliegende Band nicht nur neues Licht auf die Genese eines bedeutsamen Versuchs zur Revision der Grundlagen moderner Medizin, er gibt uberdies Einblicke in eine faszinierende geistige Konstellation zu Beginn des vergangenen Jahrhunderts. Ihrer antiken Herkunft entsprechend, werden Literatur, Philosophie und Theologie zu Gefahrten der Medizin in der Sorge um den Menschen.Der Band ist dem Andenken an den Heidelberger Philosophen Reiner Wiehl gewidmet. (shrink)

Gennaro Chtjerchia, Dynamics of meaning: anaphora, presupposition, and the the of grammar. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995.xv+ 270 pp, £59.95, £31.95 G. Pr...

Philosophers and ethicists have long neglected moral questions that arise from our interaction with non-human animals. Most assumed that human beings have a higher moral status than other animals, and that it is therefore morally permissible to use non-human animals as a source of food, clothing, and entertainment, and for scientific purposes. In recent decades, however, that assumption has been challenged, and the moral status of non-human animals is now the subject of a lively and controversial academic debate.Advances in sciences, (...) particularly the advent of evolutionary theory, made us realize that human beings and other animals are more similar than different, and force us to rethink our place in nature. We are no longer justified in thinking of ourselves as the crown of creation. We now understand that we are just one species among others, and we must ask ourselves anew – with an open and critical mind and without bias – which values and principles should guide our interaction with non-human animals, and how we should weigh our interests against those of other animals.Recognizing this important trend in moral thinking, the Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics invited me to edit a special issue on animal ethics. The interest was so great that one issue became two, of which this is the first. I am grateful to Professor Shamima Parvin Lasker and Ms. Tahera Ahmed for giving me the opportunity to serve as a guest editor, and for their assistance during the editing process. I also thank our contributors for choosing this journal to publish their excellent work, and the reviewers for their insightful comments and suggestions.This, the first special issue on animal ethics contains the following five articles:Robin Attfield and Rebekah Humphreys (“Justice and Non-Human Animals”) challenge the widely held belief that non-human animals are not included within the scope of the principles of justice, and suggest that the interests of non-human animals sometimes take precedence over the interests of human beings. The implications of their argument for our interaction with other animals are profound: E.g., it is a matter of justice and fairness to prevent avoidable and unnecessary animal suffering, rather than a mere matter of compassion.Eric X. Qi (“Special Relations, Special Obligations, and Speciesism”) develops an account of the moral significance of special relations, and uses it to argue for a modest form of speciesism that steers a middle ground between anti-speciesism and crude speciesism. Unlike anti-speciesists, he maintains that species co-membership grounds special moral obligations among the members of the same species. In contrast to crude speciesists, however, he holds that our special obligations to fellow human beings do not warrant that we always attach more weight to their interests than to the comparable interests of non-human animals.Yamikani Ndasaukaand Grivas M. Kayange (“Existence and Needs: A case for the equal moral considerability of non-human animals”) argue that the existentialist view that human beings have a higher moral status than other animals rests on a weak foundation. They consider a number of arguments that have been made in support of this view and conclude that none of them holds up to critical scrutiny. They then suggest that human beings and other animals in fact deserve equal moral consideration, and – drawing from Martin Heidegger and Abraham Maslow – ground that claim in two important commonalities between them.Sreetama Chakraborty (“Animal Ethics: Beyond Neutrality, Universality, and Consistency”) explains how the postmodern approach to animal ethics departs from the traditional approach, particularly its emphasis on the principles of neutrality, universality, and consistency, and draws attention to the pernicious hierarchy of domination that separates human beings from other animals. Building on the insights of postmodernism, she takes first steps towards a new, non-anthropocentric paradigm, in the hope to achieve a sustainable balance between human interests and the interests of non-human animals.Gabriel Vidal Quiñones (“Singerian Vegetarianism and the Limits of Utilitarianism: A path towards a Meaning Ethics”) takes a critical look at Peter Singer’s utilitarian argument for vegetarianism, and argues that the conceptual resources of utilitarianism only allow for an incomplete moral understanding of our relationship with other animals. What is lacking, he suggests, is an ethical vision. He argues that, without an ethical vision, human action threatens to degenerate into mere automatism without meaning. He proposes a “meaning ethics” that he thinks is better equipped to help us decide how we ought to treat other animals.I hope you, dear reader, will enjoy reading through this remarkable collection of articles as much as I enjoyed putting it together. Maybe you will even be inspired to do some thinking of your own about issues of animal ethics and put your thoughts down on paper. If so, I sincerely hope that you will choose the Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics to publish your article.Warm regards and best wishes for the new year. (shrink)

Inhalt: Vorwort von H.-M. Pawlowski / S. Smid / R. Specht - H.-M. Pawlowski: Probleme der Rechtsbegrundung im Staat der Glaubensfreiheit - V. Gerhardt: Selbstandigkeit und Selbstbestimmung. Freiheit bei Kant und Schelling - H. Folkers: Die durch Freiheit gebaute Stadt Gottes - W. E. Ehrhardt: Mythologie und Offenbarung der Freiheit - W. Bartuschat: Uber Spinozismus und menschliche Freiheit beim fruhen Schelling - C. Cesa: Schellings Kritik des Naturrechts - H. J. Sandkuhler: F. W. J. Schelling - Philosophie als Seinsgeschichte und (...) Anti-Politik - D. Losurdo: Von Louis Philippe bis Louis Bonaparte - R. Pettoello: Die Dialektik der menschlichen Freiheit als Emanzipation und als Abfall von Gott - H. Klenner: Schelling und die Rechtsphilosophie - S. Smid: Freiheit als Keim des Rechts - W. Schmied-Kowarzik: Freiheit - Recht - Geschichte - J. Simon: Die Wirklichkeit der Freiheit (Kant, Schelling, Hegel) - W. Schild: Die verstandlichen Schwierigkeiten des Rechtsdenkens mit dem Freiheitsbegriff - Personenregister. (shrink)

The study of the “first wave” of reactions to the Critique of Pure Reason in Germany from the second half of the 1780s until the beginning of the nineteenth century reveals the paradoxical status of the Kantian transcendental subject. While the existence of the transcendental subject, whatever the term means, is not open to question since it arises from the very essence of critical philosophy, the fundamental status of the subject is sometimes questioned in this period. Although the meaning of (...) the concept of transcendental subject seems obvious today it lends itself to various interpretations in the late eighteenth century. To achieve my goal I have undertaken a textological analysis of the works of the earliest opponents and followers of the Kantian critique and a reconstruction of the conceptual field in the midst of which the transcendental subject has been planted. Among others I draw on the works of J. S. Beck, J. A. Eberhard, J. G. Hamann, F. H. Jacobi, S. Maimon, K. L. Reinhold, G. E. Schulze and A. Weishaupt. The authors of the period are grouped depending on the common themes and questions that prompted them to turn to the concept of the transcendental subject, even though the results of their reflections did not always coincide. These authors think of the transcendental subject in its relationship to the transcendental object, or as “something = х”, and in terms of the relationship of representation to the object. It is characterised sometimes as something absolutely hollow, and sometimes as the fullness of true reality. The status ascribed to the transcendental subject is sometimes that of a thing-in-itself and sometimes that of a “mere” idea. Finally, Kant’s transcendental subject was sometimes seen as something to be overcome and sometimes as an infinite challenge to understanding. (shrink)

According to Rainer Forst, (i) moral and political claims must meet a requirement of reciprocal and general acceptability (RGA) while (ii) we are under a duty in engaged discursive practice to justify such claims to others, or be able to do so, on grounds that meet RGA. The paper critically engages this view. I argue that Forst builds a key component of RGA, i.e., reciprocity of reasons, on an idea of the reasonable that undermines both (i) and (ii): if (...) RGA builds on this idea, RGA is viciously regressive and a duty of justification to meet RGA fails to be agent transparent. This negative result opens the door for alternative conceptions of reciprocity and generality. I then suggest that a more promising conception of reciprocity and generality needs to build on an idea of the reasonable that helps to reconcile the emancipatory or protective aspirations of reciprocal and general justification with its egalitarian commitments. But this requires to downgrade RGA in the order of justification and to determine on prior, substantive grounds what level of discursive influence in reciprocal and general justification relevant agents ought to have. (shrink)

Moral and political forms of constructivism accord to people strong, “constitutive” forms of discursive standing and so build on, or express, a commitment to discursive respect. The paper explores dimensions of discursive respect, i.e., depth, scope, and purchase; it addresses tenuous interdependencies between them; on this basis, it identifies limitations of the idea of discursive respect and of constructivism. The task of locating discursive respect in the normative space defined by its three dimensions is partly, and importantly, an ethical task (...) that is beyond constructivism. Interdependencies between these dimensions call into question the possibility of a plausible and coherent form of discursive respect that is deep, inclusive in scope, and rich in purchase. This does not mean that we should reject discursive respect, or constructivism, for that matter. But it suggests that the task of reconciling the dimensions of discursive respect may not allow for widely shareable results. This task needs to be addressed on non-constructivist grounds. Accordingly, we have reasons to concede that constitutive forms of discursive standing are less fundamental in the order of justification than weaker, “derivative” forms, and this is so especially if we take constitutive standing to mark an important good. (shrink)

This study is intended as a part of a larger work containing two more monographs, one on interpersonal relations and transcendence in Romano Guardini, the other on Rudolf Bultmann and his critique of metaphysical transcendence. The thought of Buber is traced here to its historical sources in the Jewish tradition but also in Jacobi and Kierkegaard. These two authors are in fact the only ones who attempt to preserve the finitude of the human subject vis-à-vis transcendence at the very (...) beginning and at the end of subjective idealism. Husserl's establishment of a dialectic between ownness and otherness at the heart of the universal flux of consciousness is the next step in Buber's demarcation of his own ontological posture. In Husserl, the encounter with the other within the sphere of otherness is perhaps contingent, i.e., tied to the mysterious passage from the formal dispositions of transcendental consciousness to the material regions and objects that concretely actualize those formal dispositions. In Buber, as in Landgrege's [[sic]] Phänomenologie und Metaphysik, an "intersubjective reduction" must precede the reflective separation of the spheres of ownness and otherness. Indeed without judgment, there is no full reflection in Husserl, but judgment must be understood as dialogical expression before it can be seen as meaningful world orientation. Buber understood well that the source of dialogical expression is silence, yet instead of using silence as the ground of the existential communication that elucidates the boundary situations of man, he gave a beckoning interpretation of silence that must be seen as a precedent of the openness of the horizon of consciousness in Heidegger's Gelassenheit. Though Babolin does not give any indication here of the direction of the forthcoming monographs, the fact that they are about Guardini and Bultmann may indicate that he is moving away from mysticism in the remainder of this work.--A. M. (shrink)

The great value of this book does not lie in any new discovery but in its being the most comprehensive monograph to date on the major ideas of Jacobi's thinking as well as on the relationship of the "philosopher of faith" to the leading German thinkers of his time. The first chapters are devoted to a subtle analysis—focussing mainly on his novels—of the moral aspirations underlying his philosophical oeuvre. The next major theme is the well-known polemics with M. Mendelssohn (...) on Lessing's alleged Spinozism—and this is a good pretext for Prof. Verra to display his vast learning by passing in review the views of Herder, Gœthe, and Hegel on Spinoza and continuously referring to the highly important book of Heydenreich. The last three chapters deal with Jacobi's "mature" thought centered around the problem of an intuitive knowledge of reality and his violent polemics against philosophical demonstration as such, which leads necessarily—according to him—to Spinozistic pantheism, i.e., atheism. It is in these chapters that Jacobi's criticism of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling is treated. The footnotes are at the end of the chapters, and they should be read separately. They are sheer delight for anyone a little at home in this period of German intellectual history. There is also a forty page appendix: the bibliography of Jacobi's letters of which not less than 1291 are known to Prof. Verra.—M. J. V. (shrink)

Synaesthesia is a condition in which one type of stimulation evokes the sensation of another, as when the hearing of a sound produces photisms, i.e. mental percepts of colours. R is a 20 year old colour blind subject who, in addition to the relatively common grapheme-colour synaesthesia, presents a rarely reported cross modal perception in which a variety of visual stimuli elicit aura-like percepts of colour. In R, photisms seem to be closely related to the affective valence of stimuli and (...) typically bring out a consistent pattern of emotional responses. The present case study suggests that colours might be an intrinsic category of the human brain. We developed an empirical methodology that allowed us to study the subject's otherwise inaccessible phenomenological experience. First, we found that R shows a Stroop effect elicited by photisms despite the fact that he does not show a regular Stroop with real colours. Secondly, by manipulating the colour context we confirmed that colours can alter R's emotional evaluation of the stimuli. Furthermore, we demonstrated that R's auras may actually lead to a partially inverted emotional spectrum where certain stimuli bring out emotional reactions opposite to the normal ones. These findings can only be accounted for by considering R's subjective colour experience or qualia. Therefore the present paper defends the view that qualia are a useful scientific concept that can be approached and studied by experimental methods. (shrink)

The Birkhoff-Maltsev problem asks for a characterization of those lattices each of which is isomorphic to the lattice L(K) of all subquasivarieties for some quasivariety K of algebraic systems. The current status of this problem, which is still open, is discussed. Various unsolved questions that are related to the Birkhoff-Maltsev problem are also considered, including ones that stem from the theory of propositional logics.

We assume, in the first place, that two kinds of processes occur in nature: the strictly continuous and causal ones, which are governed by the Schrödinger equation and those implying discontinuities, which are ruled by probability laws. In the second place, we adopt a postulate ensuring the statistical sense of conservation laws. These hypotheses allow us to state a rule telling, in principle, in which situations and to which vectors the system's state can collapse, and which are the corresponding probabilities. (...) The way our proposed approach works is illustrated with some examples and with the analysis of the measurement problem. We obtain the exponential decay law. A comparison with other attempts to solve the measurement problem is performed. (shrink)

LetL(K) denote the lattice (ordered by inclusion) of quasivarieties contained in a quasivarietyK and letD 2 denote the variety of distributive (0, 1)-lattices with 2 additional nullary operations. In the present paperL(D 2) is described. As a consequence, ifM+N stands for the lattice join of the quasivarietiesM andN, then minimal quasivarietiesV 0,V 1, andV 2 are given each of which is generated by a 2-element algebra and such that the latticeL(V 0+V1), though infinite, still admits an easy and nice description (...) (see Figure 2) while the latticeL(V 0+V1+V2), because of its intricate inner structure, does not. In particular, it is shown thatL(V 0+V1+V2) contains as a sublattice the ideal lattice of a free lattice with free generators. Each of the quasivarietiesV 0,V 1, andV 2 is generated by a 2-element algebra inD 2. (shrink)

How ought Christians to approach moral problems? This is a question of method in moral theology. It is also a question of who is in authority to speak on matters of morality. In this essay, the moral methodology of Richard McCormick, S.J., one of the most powerful voices in contemporary Roman Catholic theology, is explored in depth. Attention is focused on its critical details, its development over time, and in particular McCormick's use of authorities in Roman Catholicism. It is argued (...) that his ethical theory is built around one central insight: that the human person in all its facets and dimensions is the criterion of the rightness and wrongness of human actions. (shrink)

Castelli has again managed to bring together in Rome some of the greatest specialists of mythology, biblical exegesis, of the different branches of linguistics, with a generous sprinkling of philosophers, theologians, and historians. From the very large number of contributions, especially important are E. Benveniste: Blasphemy and euphemy; K. Kerényi: The language of theology and the theology of language; D. McKinnon: The problem of "the system of projection" in reference to the Christian theological affirmations; R. Panikkar: Silence and word, The (...) smile of the Buddha; B. Bäumer: The secret name in Hinduism; E. Levinas: The name of God after some rabbinical texts; S. Cotta: The name of God in juridical language; P. Ric£ur: Paternity: from the phantasm to the symbol; A. de Waelhens: Paternity and the Oedipus-complex in psychoanalysis; S. Breton: Religious language, theological language; J. Brun: The pseudonyms of God; H. Bouillard: The name of God in the Credo; G. Vahanian: Writing and history; I. Manchini: A nonreligious interpretation of God; X. Tilliette: Attempt at a transition from the God of the philosophers to the God of the Christians; M. Olivetti: The beginnings of Jacobi's philosophy of language.--M. J. V. (shrink)

Discusses some of the philosophical ideas about knowledge and applies them to organizational design and information processing in order to create new ideas and new ways of thinking. Explains how this can be achieved by a discussion of the issues surrounding organizational design and the impact of design on information processing. Reviews the ideas concerning the theory of knowledge proposed by rationalists, such as Descartes and empiricists, such as Locke and how these relate to other epistemological theories such as historicism (...) and pragmatism. Concludes by discussing the means by which philosophical theories of knowledge can assist towards new considerations of information processing. (shrink)

Documents as we encounter them in everyday life are complex and diverse things, whether on paper, computer disk or on the World Wide Web. They play many roles vis-à-vis human beings, and the humans engaged with them have diverse responsibilities that are not always easy to fulfil. Added to this is the issue of how a document or literary work can change and yet retain its identity, as found in maintenance, drafting and versioning of documents. This paper explores how the (...) meaning-oriented philosophy of Herman Dooyeweerd may be used to understand the complex nature of documents, to throw light on the roles, responsibilities and culture surrounding them, and to tackle issues of identity and change. (shrink)

This is a reply to Luckiesh's comments (see 18: 608) on Tinker's\nreview of Luckiesh and Moss' book, _Reading as a visual task_\n(see 17: 962). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all\nrights reserved).